National Pension Hub

FINAL REPORT





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
Objectives

Briefly review the state of the world

- What we learned from stylized IRS models
- Compare performance of real world DB and IRS models
- Next steps

Why not DB?


- Volatile employer contributions
- Excessive cost to employer
- > Unwieldy
- Fails to meet employer needs
- Fails to meet employee needs



Why not DC?

- Decumulation options lack clarity and in many cases are <u>not fit for purpose</u>. (OECD)
- Defined contribution pensions are <u>not fit for 21st century</u> <u>lives.</u> (Altman: Pensions-time for change)
- Require people "to be able to cope with risks that they do not really understand".
- 72% of people would be more likely to save into a pension if it guaranteed a level of retirement income.

ILLUSTRATIVE DC REPLACEMENT RATES



Benefit design criteria

- > Affordable
- Sustainable
- Efficient
- > Adequate



INTERGENERATIONAL RISK SHARING (IRS) PLANS

Back to basics

Stylized IRS models

- Stationary population of workers and retirees
- All contributions paid from salary
- Transparent risk sharing
- Stochastic asset process
- Dynamic control problem...
- Objective function:
 - aggregate square difference between target and actual income
 - > or aggregate utility

Key results from theoretical analysis

Optimal Risk sharing is linear:

$$c_{t} = c - \alpha \frac{\left(A_{t} - \psi L\right)}{N_{w}}$$
$$b_{t} = b + \beta \frac{\left(A_{t} - \psi L\right)}{N_{r}}$$

Key results from theoretical analysis

> Surplus above $A_t - \psi L$ is partially shared between workers and retirees

$$\succ \quad ig(lpha+etaig)ig(A_t-\psi Lig)$$
 is the total distributed at t

- > Deficit exceeding $\psi L A_t$ similarly.
- > Deficit / surplus elimination period of $\frac{1}{\alpha + \beta}$
- Optimal α and β satisfy

$$\frac{\alpha}{\beta} \approx \frac{N_w}{N_r}$$

FROM ABSTRACT TO REAL WORLD (ISH)

Back to reality...

DB vs IRS

- > 1.8% accrual rate; 3-year FAS plan.
- Single life annuity from age 65.
- COLA up to 3%, funded; lost on wind-up.
- PUC (partial) funding; TUC solvency
- > All contributions from workers' pay*
- Invested 60% stocks, 40% long bonds
- Starting A/L = 1 (going concern)
- Normal Contribution rate 2 18.5%


DB Plan

- Funding A/L > 1.2 Contributions reduced
- Solvency A/L < 1.0 2 contributions increased,</p>
- > 30% cap on total contribution rates (TCR)
- Wind-up triggered if solvency A/L < 0.5</p>
 - Accrued benefits reduced pro-rata
 - COLA suspended
 - Bulk-buy-out I no further risk

IRS Plan

- Target benefits, valuations, assets, as for DB
- Same wind-up threshold (Solvency A/L < 0.5)</p>
- No TCR cap
- Funding A/L > 1.2 Surplus distributed
 - Based on 5-year recovery period
- Solvency A/L < 1.0 2 deficit recouped</p>
 - Based on 10-year recovery period

IRS Surplus Sharing




IRS Deficit Sharing

 $TCR = NCR + \alpha_l \frac{(\psi_l L_s - A_t)}{S(t)}$

 $BAF = 1 - \beta_l \frac{\left(\psi_l L_s - A_t\right)}{B(t)}$


IRS Parameters

Total proportion of surplus /deficit distributed each year $= \alpha_i + \beta_i, \quad j = h \text{ (high)}, l \text{ (low)}$ Five year spread of surplus $\Rightarrow \alpha_h + \beta_h = \frac{1}{5}$ Ten year spread of deficit $\Rightarrow \alpha_l + \beta_l = \frac{1}{10}$ Also $\frac{\alpha_h}{\beta_h} = \frac{\alpha_l}{\beta_l} = \frac{S(t)}{B(t)}$




Assets/Liabilities

Year




Assets/Liabilities

TCR, DB, NO Cap




Year


TCR, DB, 30% Cap



Year


TCR, IRS





Age


Real Income Paths; age 45; IRS




Comparison metrics

- Probability of wind-up
 - Sustainability, adequacy, efficiency, fairness
- Average total contribution rate
 - > Affordability
- Income stability compares actual and target income
 - > Adequacy, fairness, efficiency
 - Plotted across a range of equity weighting

Wind-up Risk by equity weighting





Average TCR by equity weighting



Notes on income stability (IS)

- IS² is the average squared disparity of actual and target income.
- Low values are better
- Positive and negative disparities are penalised equally
- Calculated by cohort
- Similar to the objective function used in theory papers





FAIRNESS?

Heterogeneity in active member classes

Salaried vs Non-Salaried Employees

- Identical demographics
- Flat salary scale from age 30

	Default Rate	Average TCR
DB Salaried	4.9%	18.5%
DB Non-salaried	0.2%	14.4%
	Default Rate	Average TCR
IRS Salaried	Default Rate 1.2%	Average TCR 18.3%

CONCLUSIONS

Back to the future

Conclusions (1): usefulness of theory

- Theoretical results pointed to:
 - > appropriate risk sharing mechanism
 - > parameter constraints and relationships
 - > the income stability metric
 - > fair transition process

Conclusions (2): IRS plan advantages

- IRS with a linear risk sharing mechanism is
 - > Transparent,
 - Relatively robust
 - Surprisingly effective
- IRS dominates DB on affordability, sustainability, efficiency (based on strong modelling assumptions)
- With default risk, IRS may dominate DB on adequacy
 - IRS improves fairness between generations

Conclusions (3): More work required

- IRS does not much mitigate blue-collar/white collar inequity
- But IRS + CARE helps.
- To be further investigated
 - Fairness of discretionary COLA
 - Fairness between stayers and leavers
 - Separating worker/sponsor objectives

Selected References

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