The Belt and Road Initiative:
INVESTMENT OPPORTUNITIES IN CHINA’S “PROJECT OF THE CENTURY”

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INTRODUCTION

In the autumn of 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping set forth a bold new policy vision for the 21st century global economy, calling for the creation of a new Silk Road Economic Belt and complimentary Maritime Silk Road to span the length of the Eurasian supercontinent. This “Belt and Road Initiative” (BRI) promises to link China to both neighbouring and distant regions along its southern and western frontiers through a mass infrastructure investment project, including roads, rail lines, ports, energy pipelines and digital networks. The project also incorporates non-physical components, like policy coordination, monetary integration, trade policy, and person-to-person exchanges. The symbolism of the BRI draws upon important historical parallels. Created by the Han Dynasty over two thousand years ago, the medieval Silk Road once passed through Central and Southern Asia on its way to Europe, facilitating trade and cultural interaction. Seaborne “Spice Roads” complimented the land passage, stretching from the Japanese coast, past China and India, and into the Middle East and Mediterranean Sea. Beijing seeks to recreate these linkages and forge an interstate “Community of Common Destiny” across the region.

If successful, BRI could not only instigate unprecedented development in participating states but set the rules and standards that direct economic activity in Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific region for decades to come. This paradigm shift may have significant consequences for the Canadian financial services industry as it increasingly looks to emerging markets in Asia for future growth. Although Beijing may not seek to totally upend the existing international order, a Chinese-led economic sphere in Eurasia could test the predominately Anglo-American tradition upon which the international financial system is founded. While banks, investors and insurers look to seize the immense opportunities that the BRI creates, risk managers seeking to adapt to the new policy environment should look to better understand the project and develop flexible governance strategies in response.

SCOPE

The “Belt” in the BRI refers to the land-based component, subdivided into six broadly defined economic corridors, while the “Road” references the corresponding sea routes (see Figure 1 and Table 1). The initiative’s geographic range is transcontinental, encompassing both Africa and Latin America. In total, the BRI incorporates more than 60 countries (figures vary), affects nearly 62% of the world’s population and includes more than 30% of global gross domestic product. Yet despite its impressive metrics, the project still satisfies only a fraction of the larger infrastructure demand in the region. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) estimates that the continent will require more than $26 trillion of investment between 2016 and 2030.
The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”

Figure 1: Map of the Belt and Road

Table 1: States Traversed by the Belt and Road (By Corridor)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BRI Corridor</th>
<th>States Involved</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC)</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar Economic Corridor (BCIMEC)</td>
<td>Bangladesh India, Myanmar</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor (CCWAEC)</td>
<td>Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Indochina Peninsula Economic Corridor (CICPEC)</td>
<td>Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Thailand, Vietnam</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China-Mongolia-Russia Economic Corridor (CMREC)</td>
<td>Mongolia, Russia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Eurasia Land Bridge Economic Corridor (NELB)</td>
<td>Belarus, Czech Republic, Poland, Kazakhstan, Germany, Russia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Center For Strategic And International Studies

18
Notwithstanding the existing proposal, the specific physical and conceptual margins of the BRI remain ambiguous. There is no clear timeline set for completion, and some projects begun prior to the official launch date are included retroactively. Physical infrastructure projects are complimented with intangibles like trade accords, cultural exchanges, tourism and educational connections. In addition to transportation networks and energy systems, the BRI’s infrastructure portfolio has grown to include electronic, space, and polar elements. The proposed “Digital Silk Road,” for example, includes new underwater and terrestrial fibre optic cable installations and other expanded communications systems. China may also seek to influence internet governance, exporting its state-centered cyber model and mandating data localization. Related to the new digital proposals, the Space and Information Corridor centers on the launch of Beidou 2, a 35-unit satellite network and alternative to the American Global Positioning System (GPS). Finally, the State Council Information Office has linked BRI to Beijing’s new Arctic policy. Set forth in a January 2018 white paper, the plan includes increased resource extraction and other commercial, environmental and scientific activities.

Since its inauguration, the BRI has generally fallen short of initial promises. As per data from the American Enterprise Institute (AEI) and the Heritage Foundation, the total value of Chinese construction between January 2014 and June 2018 reached at least $256 billion across 75 affiliated countries, while Chinese investment summed to $148 billion. Relative to previous activity across the same group of states, these figures are less striking: the value of construction amounted to $157 billion in the four to five years prior to the launch of the New Silk Road. In terms of actual projects, little progress has been made on 5 of the 6 defined routes; the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) being the one exception. That being said, CPEC has faced opposition in Pakistan as internal parties contest over funding allocation. Further afield, political resistance of one kind or another has sprouted in several other participating states along the Belt and Road.

OBJECTIVES

Although cooperative economic development remains the official goal of the BRI, analysts have speculated that the project could also meet a plethora of tributary objectives. The Belt and Road may deliver various political, economic and monetary benefits to China over a long time horizon.

Export of Excess Industrial Capacity and Savings

In the past, China has produced significantly more steel and other raw materials than its economy could absorb. Demand for these resources has fallen in correlation with the country’s declining economic growth rate. The BRI is a chance to export overcapacity in equipment, steel and cement production by state-owned enterprises. It also affords Beijing a chance to allocate its substantial domestic savings reserves.

Renminbi Internationalization

Although China constituted 12% of total international trade by volume in 2014, its representation in international payment currency markets was comparatively minimal at 2%. The BRI is a means to further proliferate the use of the Chinese currency. As the project develops, affiliated countries will increasingly benefit from adopting the RMB for loans and trade settlement, and the People’s Bank of China and state-owned institutions have already taken policy steps to ease cross-border, yuan-denominated transactions.

Energy Trade Diversification

In 2016, almost 80% of Chinese oil imports travelled by tanker through the Malacca Straits and South China Sea, and there is concern that overreliance on a single waterway could become a strategic chokehold for Beijing. To solve this “Malacca Dilemma,” the BRI can help to protect China’s energy supply by diversifying the import channels for oil and gas, particularly through the land-based corridors viewed to be comparatively safer than traditional maritime routes.
The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”

Rural Economic Development
The rapid economic growth in Eastern China has not necessarily benefitted the Western and Southern frontier regions of the country. Peripheral provinces are pushing BRI projects because they see them as the best means of facilitating regional development.\(^{37}\) If it works as intended, the initiative could create more balanced economic prosperity and increased domestic competitiveness and integration.\(^{38}\)

Foreign Market Development & Competitiveness
By linking China to developing countries in Central and Southern Asia, the BRI promises to open up new markets for export,\(^{39}\) including for high quality goods like high speed rail.\(^{40}\) The Initiative can also be an engine of economic growth in participating countries that further increases their demand for Chinese imports.\(^{41}\)

FINANCING
The BRI’s funding architecture has two distinct channels. The public branch, which includes multilateral and national institutional lenders,\(^{44}\) has served as the primary source of infrastructure financing with a more that 90% share in Asian projects.\(^{45}\) The private channel, which includes international investors, is comparatively less advanced\(^{46}\) but will need to play a critical role in the development of the Belt and Road and may increasingly provide investment and service opportunities for international institutions and investors going forward.\(^{47}\)

Institutional
Central to the multilateral apparatus for capitalizing the Belt and Road is the Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB). Launched in January 2016, the AIIB comprises 93-member states and invests “in sustainable infrastructure and other productive sectors in Asia and beyond...”\(^{48}\) China spearheaded the AIIB as an alternative to established financial organizations like the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and the IMF.\(^{49}\) Another important sponsor for the BRI is the New Development Bank (NDB). The NDB brought together China, Russia, Brazil, India and South Africa—the “BRICS” countries—in July 2014 to create a lending agency\(^{50}\) focused on funding “sustainable development” and infrastructure projects for its membership, with an option to include other developing countries over time.\(^{51}\) Similar to the AIIB, the NDB serves as a substitute to existing multilateral development banks.\(^{52}\)

Notwithstanding the potential of these international organizations to scale up investment over time, Beijing has played a clear leadership role in the management of Belt and Road finance thus far through its dedicated state-run investment pool, domestic policy lenders and commercial banks. With $40 billion in authorized capital, the Silk Road Fund operates as a private equity cache supplied primarily by China’s substantial foreign currency reserves and intended specifically to service the BRI.\(^{53}\) First created by the Chinese government in 1994, the

Geopolitical Influence and National Rejuvenation
The BRI may be intended to convert China into a central economic and geopolitical node in the Eurasian region.\(^{42}\) It may also have a larger historical significance as well. President Xi Jinping’s core mission is to effectively “Make China Great Again,” encapsulating his “China Dream” to win the nation wealth, power and respect in the world once more. As the narrative prescribes, Beijing will have then restored the dominant position that it occupied prior to the era of Western imperialism.\(^{43}\)
national policy banks are designed to meet narrow lending objectives and include the Agricultural Development Bank of China (ADB), the China Development Bank (CDB) and the Export-Import Bank of China (EXIM). The CDB and EXIM in particular are perhaps the most important sources of funding for the Belt and Road. Finally, the Chinese commercial banking sector is led by the “Big Four” state-owned houses: The China Construction Bank, Bank of China, Industrial and Commercial Bank of China, and Agricultural Bank of China. These institutions are currently raising foreign investment in RMB to supply BRI projects, including through bond issuance.

**Private**

China presents significant opportunities for international private capital allocation. Although foreign investment in China has traditionally focused on physical assets like factories and office space, there is a transition underway towards a greater percentage of equities and fixed-income securities. China now hosts the second- and third-largest stock and bond markets in the world respectively. Increased foreign investment activity in these exchanges sets a new precedent, as capital controls have traditionally limited access for international actors. The Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor (QFII) and Renminbi Foreign Institutional Investor (RQFII) programs license international parties to access the Chinese domestic market. However, in January 2019, regulators doubled the total shareholder quota under the QFII from $150 billion to $300 billion. Other reforms have further eased restrictions. In April 2018, Beijing increased the cap on foreign control of stockbroking companies from 49% to 51%, allowing for foreign majority ownership. The following June, China also removed the 20% limit on monthly exports of QFII and RQFII investment income.

In March 2018, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SSE) and Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) set forth new regulations for the BRI bond pilot project. The new standards define what kind of securities (by eligible issuer, purpose of funding) can be listed under the new asset category and includes terms and procedure for issuance, expenditure of funds and regulatory reporting, among other considerations. The BRI bond market could attract enough capital from abroad to meet the demand that supranational and domestic institutional lenders cannot entirely fill. Nevertheless, the product line could still present some investment risk. Belt and Road denoted securities might not be an optimal funding option either, as bond maturity periods are often shorter than project construction and so repayment is expected before infrastructure assets actually earn any revenue. To compliment the fixed-income securities market, there are other possible avenues for foreign investor participation in BRI, including equities trading, infrastructure concessions and auxiliary financial services.

**Fixed-Income**

**Domestic Bonds (Certified Belt & Road):**

This class is issued by domestic companies, sold on mainland markets (SSE and SZSE) and denominated in RMB. As per rules governing the nascent BRI bond class, either Chinese government or corporate securities are certifiable if connected to a Belt and Road project. Corporate bonds can include both financial (policy banks, commercial banks, etc.) or other non-financial corporate debt instruments.

**“Panda” Bonds (Certified Belt & Road):**

This class is issued by international companies, sold on mainland markets and denominated in RMB. It is targeted specifically at garnering corporate investment from domestic Chinese investors. Under the new CSRC fixed income regulations, foreign governments and companies from along Belt and Road corridors and non-Chinese firms raising funds for specific BRI projects are eligible to issue Panda bonds within the new asset category.

**Dim Sum Bonds:**

This class is issued by Chinese and international companies in Hong Kong but denominated in RMB. It is exempt from PRC regulation, and so is accessible to investors that are otherwise unable to access Chinese markets. The BRI is projected to increase Dim Sum issuance on the Hong Kong exchange moving forward.
CONTROVERSIES

In its initial phase, the BRI has not been immune to controversy. Its immediate effects and long-term implications, both on the ground in individual countries and across the larger Indo-Pacific, have instilled apprehension and distrust in some regional and international observers.

ACCUSATIONS OF “DEBTBOOK DIPLOMACY”

Through its state-run institutions, China has adopted a “no strings attached” policy for foreign investment, starkly contrasting a Western approach that often requires lenders to enact free-market and other reforms before securing a loan. This willingness to provide open financing with few conditions has given Chinese institutions a distinct advantage over global competitors like the International Monetary Fund. However, many states along the Belt and Road are now indebted beyond their ability to repay. High rates of sovereign leverage have led to accusations that China is practicing “Debtbook Diplomacy,” using its influence as a creditor nation to advance geopolitical objectives.

Beyond questions of accessibility, the settlement terms attached to existing BRI loans may also contribute to the suspicions held among some spectators. Capital deficiencies induce many developing states to use the new Belt and Road assets themselves as collateral for a BRI loan, leaving Chinese lenders with concessions or leases of these assets in the case of default. One such case involves the construction and transfer of the Hambantota Port on Sri Lanka’s southern coast (see Figure 1). In 2017, Colombo sold a 99-year, 70% ownership lease in the new maritime facility for $1.1 billion to the state-owned China Merchants Group. In response to foreign criticism, Beijing has rejected accusations that its investment decisions are intended to drown recipients in debt and serve political interests. Concern about Chinese lending has nevertheless increased among some BRI participants, including Uganda, Zambia and the Maldives. Perhaps the
The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”

RISK APPRAISAL

CREDIT RISK: DEBT ACCUMULATION AND DEFAULT

Perhaps more than 50% of countries hosting Belt and Road projects have credit ratings that fail to meet investment grade.96 In Laos, a Chinese-funded railway link under construction is valued at upwards of half the national GDP,97 while debt servicing accounted for 90% of Sri Lankan state revenue by 2015.98 Leverage to such an extent would imply a significant probability of default under standard lending conditions. Yet in their role as the primary funding source for the BRI thus far,99 state-backed Chinese institutions have demonstrated a risk appetite substantially higher than that of most international investors. Canadian financial service providers issuing loans along the Belt and Road could be exposed to significant credit risk, and find it difficult to realize on the limited range of collateral available to governments in many participating countries. Fixed-income securities and fee-based ancillary services could offer some insulation against nonpayment by subprime borrowers. However, recent prudential actions on the part of highly indebted governments suggest that major defaults are less likely over the long-term. A number of countries have moved to reject or rethink projects due to fiscal concerns: not only Malaysia, but also Pakistan, Sierra Leone, Bangladesh and Myanmar.100 Although more restrained lending could slow the pace of construction and investment, it may also instill greater market confidence and secure a stable source of private financing for the BRI over time.

POLITICAL RISK: CORRUPTION, INSTABILITY, AND OPPOSITION

As it continues to evolve, the BRI has the potential to exacerbate existing tensions between Washington and Beijing. The United States has accused the Chinese of seeking “to shape a world antithetical to U.S. values and interests”88 and of forwarding a plan to “target their investments in the developing world to expand influence and gain competitive advantages against the United States.”89 Vice-President Mike Pence has explicitly criticized China for its alleged “debt diplomacy”90 and contrasted the Chinese and American foreign investment approaches, stating that “[w]e don’t drown our partners in a sea of debt. We don’t coerce or compromise your independence.”91 As a response to Chinese lending activities, the U.S. Congress recently authorized the creation of the U.S. International Development Finance Corporation (IDFC).92 Beyond the provision of loans, the IDFC can hold ownership stakes in infrastructure assets and offer political risk protection to companies operating in developing countries.93 Seeking to employ local workers and facilitate greater private sector investment, the IDFC can work to avoid the debt trap problem created by the BRI.94 Only $60 billion in funding has been allocated to the organization thus far; China committed an equivalent sum to Africa alone at a September 2017 forum.95 Nevertheless, increased competition between the IDFC and the BRI could thicken the geopolitical climate and contribute to a wider U.S.-China conflict.
Chinese investment. Furthermore, security threats like terrorism and sectarian conflict loom over the land-based economic corridors. Disruption to international relations in the greater Indo-Pacific region is another potential consequence of the BRI. The geopolitical dimension is exemplified by the effects of the Belt and Road on the Sino-Indian relationship. Although India has cooperated on select Chinese-led initiatives like the AIIB, it has reacted with vigour against the New Silk Road. Beijing’s maritime plans have heightened fervor for the “String of Pearls” theory, a belief that BRI port infrastructure is actually designed to project Chinese power in the Indian Ocean and undermine New Delhi’s influence and security.

For institutional investors, local and international political risks present a challenge for which management strategies are limited. Project delays or cancellations and physical damage associated with civil or violent action could affect repayment rates on debt instruments like BRI bonds and devalue infrastructure holdings. Strategic competition between rival states can produce regulatory discrepancies, trade disputes or segmented business environments over which private actors have negligible influence. Associations with controversial projects could also pose reputational problems, with implications for financial service providers operating where the Belt and Road faces increasing opposition. However, the introduction of new BRI asset classes that better link specific investments with companies and projects could help financial institutions to more accurately measure their portfolio risk and develop contingency plans for loss-inducing political events.

**REGULATORY RISK: PARADIGM SHIFT**

The BRI proposes to link a large group of states with diverse political and regulatory systems and distinct cultural traditions. At a micro-level, foreign investors and lending institutions may struggle to accommodate for national differences and manage their legal compliance throughout the life of a given project. In the short- to medium-term, risk managers will need to hedge against jurisdictional frictions along the Belt and Road as it poses both a direct enterprise risk to financial institutions and an indirect hazard as a possible impediment to project coordination. The long-term regulatory challenge for Canadian financial services, however, stems from the systematic transformation that the BRI could instigate across a large proportion of the global economy. The New Silk Road incorporates developing countries that will host a significant portion of future industry growth, and the BRI empowers Beijing to act as the primary architect of banking systems, trade and investment rules and institutions across these markets. Examples of a developing Chinese approach to economic governance continue to emerge. As part of the Belt and Road, China is prepared to export fintech innovations including rural and mobile banking and cross-border payment systems; a process that could further support RMB internationalization. Beijing has begun to shape legal procedure in the region with the appointing of International Commercial Courts in Xian and Shenzhen, set to apply Chinese domestic law in the settlement of BRI-related disputes. Furthermore, Chinese rules around data governance and content control are mirrored in countries like Tanzania, Nigeria and Egypt.

In its effect on standard setting, the BRI could significantly disrupt the working environment for incumbent firms. American and European companies may find it more difficult to commercialize technological innovations in nations where Chinese standards predominate. For the Canadian financial industry specifically, the shifting paradigm creates risk when looking to sell services in new consumer markets. Chinese state internet controls challenge Western security standards and privacy laws, and Chinese data localization policies run against liberalized digital information flows in other jurisdictions. Additionally, Chinese commercial law and arbitration procedure may deviate dramatically from common law standards. Canadian institutions operating in states along the Belt and Road may be forced to reconcile their business practices with competing regulatory systems.
CONCLUSION

The BRI remains in its nascent stages and Chinese leaders may have the means to adjust course and correct for the problems encountered in its initial phase. Whether they can totally respond to current and emerging challenges is unclear, although China’s almost unprecedented economic success over the past decade speaks both to Beijing’s policy-making acumen and its determination to succeed. Risk managers should continue to monitor and respond to the underlying threats faced by their enterprises while balancing against the vast opportunities that the Belt and Road may afford to the Canadian financial services industry.
ENDNOTES


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The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”


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The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”


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The Belt and Road Initiative: Investment Opportunities in China’s “Project of the Century”

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